skills/legout/skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office.py executes the LibreOffice binary (soffice or libreoffice) to render documents to PDF and PNG.
  • It uses subprocess.run with an argument list rather than a shell string, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities.
  • The script identifies the binary location using shutil.which and a list of standard installation paths for macOS and Windows.
  • It uses a fresh temporary profile via the -env:UserInstallation flag to ensure the rendering process is isolated from any existing user sessions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external .docx files which may contain instructions intended to override the agent's behavior when the document content is read.
  • Ingestion points: The Document object in scripts/edit.py and the validate/render functions in scripts/office.py ingest untrusted OOXML data from external files.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation in SKILL.md explicitly warns that rendering is not a sandbox for unknown third-party files and cautions against opening embedded objects.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute subprocesses (LibreOffice), write new files to the file system (via zipfile and Path.open), and read arbitrary file content within permitted directories.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses the defusedxml library for all XML parsing to mitigate XML External Entity (XXE) and other XML-based attacks. It also implements checks for unsafe ZIP member paths (e.g., directory traversal via ..) during validation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 11:44 AM