docx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office.pyexecutes the LibreOffice binary (sofficeorlibreoffice) to render documents to PDF and PNG. - It uses
subprocess.runwith an argument list rather than a shell string, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - The script identifies the binary location using
shutil.whichand a list of standard installation paths for macOS and Windows. - It uses a fresh temporary profile via the
-env:UserInstallationflag to ensure the rendering process is isolated from any existing user sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external
.docxfiles which may contain instructions intended to override the agent's behavior when the document content is read. - Ingestion points: The
Documentobject inscripts/edit.pyand thevalidate/renderfunctions inscripts/office.pyingest untrusted OOXML data from external files. - Boundary markers: The documentation in
SKILL.mdexplicitly warns that rendering is not a sandbox for unknown third-party files and cautions against opening embedded objects. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute subprocesses (LibreOffice), write new files to the file system (via
zipfileandPath.open), and read arbitrary file content within permitted directories. - Sanitization: The skill uses the
defusedxmllibrary for all XML parsing to mitigate XML External Entity (XXE) and other XML-based attacks. It also implements checks for unsafe ZIP member paths (e.g., directory traversal via..) during validation.
Audit Metadata