orchestrate-implementation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external, potentially untrusted project documentation to direct automated agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads ADRs, specifications, issues, and plans during the 'Intake and preflight' phase (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions emphasize extracting constraints and acceptance criteria but do not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the processed content.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator dispatches subagents with mutation authority in managed worktrees (references/pi-dispatch.md).
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the intake data is described; the skill relies on scout agents to normalize content.
- [SAFE]: The skill enforces significant security best practices, including repository cleanliness verification, mandatory git isolation for parallel mutation, and strict human/supervisor gates for high-risk operations like pushing code, merging, or deployment. The use of subagents is scoped by specific task contracts and bounded file references.
Audit Metadata