orchestrate-implementation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub issues (via
gh issue view) and implementation plans, which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: GitHub issue bodies and comments, external plan files (e.g.,
fixtures/feature-plan.md). - Boundary markers: The skill uses explicit contracts (e.g., in
references/manifest-and-briefs.md) and instructions like "Approved scope outranks reviewer suggestions" and "Ignore previous instructions" to delimit the agent's task. - Capability inventory: Extensive Git command execution (
git worktree,git update-ref,git apply), and the ability to launch sub-agents across various platforms (Native Pi, Herdr, Paseo, T3). - Sanitization: The skill mandates physical path validation, symlink checks, and canonicalization of worktree roots to prevent directory traversal or unauthorized file access.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed shell recipes for managing Git worktrees and references to ensure task isolation.
- Evidence: Extensive use of shell scripts in
references/git-handoff.md,references/herdr-dispatch.md, andreferences/review-and-recovery.mdfor repository management. These commands are constrained to an absolute shared root directory (${XDG_STATE_HOME:-$HOME/.local/state}/worktrees/) and include error handling (set -euo pipefail).
Audit Metadata