skills/lelborn/skills/gh-templates/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gh-templates

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from local repository files to customize scaffolded templates, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read repository files such as package.json, Makefile, and .github/workflows/*.yml (as specified in SKILL.md) to extract project-specific lint, test, and build commands.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters for the content read from these files before it is interpolated into template bodies.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs file system write operations to create templates in the .github/ directory and can execute shell commands via the gh CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the strings extracted from repository files before they are written into markdown templates.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill enables the agent to execute GitHub CLI commands to modify repository settings.
  • The agent is instructed to offer to create repository labels using gh label create for bug, enhancement, and chore types.
  • Evidence: The skill explicitly includes a safeguard requiring user confirmation before executing these commands to prevent unauthorized changes to repository configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 01:56 PM