rps-to-buku-ajar
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute local Python scripts via the command line, specifically using the pattern
python .codex/skills/scripts/parse_rps.py "<rps_file_or_text>". This method of executing scripts is high-risk when handling untrusted data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. By interpolating the untrusted
rps_file_or_textdirectly into a shell command, the skill allows an attacker to escape the double-quoted string (e.g., using"; malicious_command; ") and perform arbitrary command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION_SURFACE]: The following evidence chain documents the vulnerability surface: 1. Ingestion points: The
<rps_file_or_text>placeholder inSKILL.mdreceives untrusted user content. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the input is wrapped in quotes but not sanitized or escaped. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via thepythoninvocation. 4. Sanitization: Absent; there are no instructions to validate or clean the syllabus text before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata