fiction-cover-designer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input, such as book titles, author names, and synopses, which are then interpolated into AI image generation prompts and passed as arguments to a local helper script. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the input could influence the agent's behavior or the output of the image generator.
- Ingestion points: User-provided fields including
Title & Subtitle,Author/Creator Names, andBack-Cover Contentdefined in the Agent Contract section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat user-supplied text as data only, lacking "ignore embedded instructions" warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes the capability to execute shell commands via a Python helper script (
helpers/python/fal_image_generator.py). - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions or mechanisms provided in the skill to sanitize or escape user-provided strings before they are incorporated into commands or prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an example of a shell command to be executed by the agent or user. This command includes a
--promptargument that is intended to be filled with text descriptions. If the agent dynamically constructs this command using unvalidated user input, it presents a risk of command injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the runtime assembly and execution of shell commands. Specifically, it instructs the agent to use a local Python script (
helpers/python/fal_image_generator.py) to generate images based on dynamically generated prompt strings.
Audit Metadata