startup-workflow-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to locate and install missing specialist skills from the external domain
skills.shusingnpx. This allows for the runtime download and execution of arbitrary code from a third-party source that is not recognized as a trusted provider. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow depends on several external automation agent skills, including
stablyai/orca@computer-use,midscene-skills@computer-automation, andcodex-skills@gemini-computer-use. These components originate from unverified external repositories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of shell-based commands through
npxand delegates operations to sub-agents capable of system-level automation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an orchestrator for untrusted data, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. 1. Ingestion points: The skill reads from
.agents/startup_dna.mdand processes direct user requests. 2. Boundary markers: The skill mentions enforcing security gates for releases but lacks explicit input delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the data it processes. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can invoke sub-agents and execute remote code installation commands. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of input data before it influences orchestration logic or script installation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata