grill-with-docs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from the project codebase, research papers, notes, experiment logs, and existing documentation to ground its grilling questions.
- Capability inventory: It has the capability to update the
AGENTS.mdfile (which serves as a canonical instruction set for future agents), create new research documentation files, and initiate 'scout' or 'ship' tasks that involve project changes. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to wrap ingested content in delimiters or to provide the model with 'ignore' directives for content found within external files.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization of the extracted data before synthesizing it into durable project records or agent instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill initiates external actions by dispatching tasks to other components of the agent system.
- It dispatches 'scout' tasks for technical investigations and 'ship' tasks for delivering project modifications.
- While the actual execution is delegated to 'crewmates' or platform 'machinery,' the skill constructs the briefs that drive these subsequent command-line operations.
Audit Metadata