avileo-catalog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external product imports and storefront URL inspections.
- Ingestion points: The
catalog import previewcommand (documented inreferences/bulk-import.md) processes external product lists from various sources, and the storefront review (documented inreferences/audit-and-recommendations.md) processes content from public URLs. - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdandreferences/images.mdinclude explicit instructions to treat all external content (product names, descriptions, scraped pages, URLs) as untrusted data and never as instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network operations and modify catalog data, although state-changing actions are constrained by the approval workflow.
- Sanitization: All mutations are gated by a durable server-side proposal and human-in-the-loop approval process, where the agent cannot apply changes without a human-verified approval ID.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx --yesto fetch and execute specific versions of the@tarileo/avileo-catalog-clipackage. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes shell commands using the Avileo CLI and provides instructions for local development workflows that involve using
bunto build the SDK and execute code from source directories.
Audit Metadata