serial-monitor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/serial_monitor.pyutilizessubprocess.run()to execute theopenocdbinary for device reset functionality. Additionally, the_read_openocd_path()function retrieves the path to the executable from a local workspace file named.em_skill.json. If the agent runs this skill within an untrusted or maliciously crafted project directory, it could result in the execution of an unintended or malicious binary specified in the configuration file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from external serial interfaces, presenting an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: In
scripts/serial_monitor.py, external data is ingested from serial connections viaser.read()and printed line-by-line to the standard output. - Boundary markers: Absent. The captured serial text enters the agent's context without any encapsulation or structural delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill contains system command execution capabilities via
subprocess.run()insidescripts/serial_monitor.py. - Sanitization: The script performs text cleanup via
strip_ansi()to remove terminal escape sequences, but it does not sanitize or validate natural language instruction content, which could allow a connected serial device to output malicious instructions targeting the agent.
Audit Metadata