autoresearch-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow for processing and refining arbitrary 'instruction atoms' and 'evaluation suites', which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed content contains malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during the evaluation loop.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md('Select one eligible atom') andreferences/eval-suite.md('prompts, assertions, fixtures'). - Boundary markers: The skill requires freezing the suite digest for integrity (
references/eval-suite.md) and mandates an isolation boundary for the target atom within the harness adapter (references/harness-adapter.md). - Capability inventory: The documentation specifies that a harness adapter must 'execute the frozen suite' and report measurements. No actual implementation scripts or subprocess calls are provided within the skill files themselves.
- Sanitization: The methodology emphasizes immutable audit trails and digest verification but does not describe explicit content sanitization or filtering for the instruction atoms or evaluation suite inputs.
- [NO_CODE]: The skill consists entirely of markdown documentation and JSON evaluation data; no executable scripts, binaries, or platform-specific code were found within the provided files.
Audit Metadata