brenda-database
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mdidentifies the author as 'K-Dense Inc.', which differs from the platform-provided author identity 'leonchaox'. While not inherently malicious, this discrepancy represents a metadata inconsistency. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests biochemical data (kinetic parameters and reaction information) from the external BRENDA SOAP API, which is subsequently processed into reports and visualizations. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the external database were to contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the
get_km_valuesandget_reactionsfunctions inscripts/brenda_queries.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not utilize specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from interpreting ingested data as commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write text reports, export structured data files (CSV, JSON), and generate PNG visualizations.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on regular expressions for data extraction but does not sanitize the contents of database commentary fields for potential injection strings.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The utility script
scripts/brenda_queries.pyperforms aggressive path manipulation by adding a directory four levels above the script's location to thesys.path. This dynamic path calculation is used to import thebrenda_clientmodule but represents a non-standard loading pattern that could potentially allow the skill to access or import modules from outside its own directory structure.
Audit Metadata