docx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains embedded C source code that is written to the temporary directory and compiled at runtime usinggcc. The resulting shared object is then loaded into the execution environment viaLD_PRELOAD. This is used to shim AF_UNIX socket operations for LibreOffice in sandboxed environments. While the source code is static, the capability to compile and inject native code is a high-privilege operation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external Word documents, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Documents are processed via
scripts/office/unpack.py(XML extraction) and thepandocextraction examples provided inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use explicit boundary markers or instruction-guarding delimiters when presenting extracted text to the agent context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has powerful capabilities, including executing external binaries via
subprocess.run(soffice, pandoc, git, gcc) and arbitrary file system write access viascripts/office/pack.py. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the text or XML content extracted from documents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses
subprocess.runto call system utilities such assoffice,pandoc,pdftoppm, andgit. These implementations use argument lists (notshell=True), which correctly mitigates standard shell injection vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata