hypogenic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it directly interpolates untrusted data from training and test datasets into LLM prompts using variables like
${text_features_1},${sample_text}, and${observations}. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from JSON files specified in the
config.yaml(e.g.,train_data_path,test_data_path) as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/config_template.yaml. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the prompt templates in
references/config_template.yaml. - Capability inventory: The skill enables the execution of shell commands via CLI tools (
hypogenic_generation,hypogenic_inference) and setup scripts (setup_grobid.sh), creating a path for malicious instructions in datasets to influence agent actions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of dataset content is mentioned or implemented in the provided configuration files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download datasets and example code from public GitHub repositories (
github.com/ChicagoHAI/HypoGeniC-datasets.gitandgithub.com/ChicagoHAI/Hypothesis-agent-datasets.git). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the execution of multiple shell commands for installation and operation, including
uv pip install,git clone, andbashexecution for infrastructure setup (e.g.,setup_grobid.sh,run_grobid.sh). These commands are consistent with the skill's stated purpose as a CLI research tool.
Audit Metadata