infographics
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runin a wrapper script to manage the execution of its core AI generation logic. The command is constructed using a list of arguments rather than a raw string, which effectively mitigates shell injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with
openrouter.aito access AI services provided by Google and Perplexity. This is a standard and well-known service for managing multiple AI models, and the network operations are limited to this specific API endpoint. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user descriptions and external research data which are then used to build prompts for AI generation and review. This ingestion of untrusted external content represents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts and data gathered from Perplexity Sonar research.
- Boundary markers: The current implementation does not use explicit delimiters to separate external data from system instructions within the generated prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill is permitted to write files (images and logs) and execute shell commands within its restricted environment.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization logic was found for the external text inputs before they are interpolated into the prompt templates.
Audit Metadata