latex-posters
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill outlines a workflow to ingest external research content, such as scientific papers or outlines, and convert them into poster format, creating an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion Points: Research papers, outlines, and abstracts provided by the user are ingested into the agent context during Stage 1 and Stage 4 of the workflow.
- Boundary Markers: Absent. The templates and prompts do not specify structural boundaries or special delimiters to encapsulate untrusted user input.
- Capability Inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute LaTeX compilation utilities (pdflatex,lualatex,xelatex), Ghostscript (gs), and local helper scripts (scripts/review_poster.sh). - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or escaping mechanisms are defined for user-supplied data before it is interpolated into prompts or LaTeX templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill commands the execution of multiple command-line utilities via the
Bashtool to support document compilation, automated quality checks, and package management. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdandscripts/review_poster.shdescribe invocations ofpdflatex,pdfinfo,pdffonts,pdfimages,gs(Ghostscript), andtlmgr installfor package setup. These operations utilize standard local environment binaries required for LaTeX building workflows.
Audit Metadata