paper-slide-deck

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/generate-slides.py uses subprocess.check_call to automatically install the google-genai package using the system's Python executable. This is used to ensure the environment is ready for image generation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves external dependencies at runtime. It uses pip to download the google-genai package from PyPI and employs npx to run Node.js tools, which may download packages like pdfjs-dist, canvas, and pptxgenjs from the NPM registry.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime installation and execution of external packages from PyPI and NPM are present. However, the packages identified are well-known libraries from trusted sources (Google, PDF.js contributors, etc.) required for the skill's primary purpose of PDF processing and image generation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection risks (Category 8) as it ingests untrusted data from academic papers and user-provided content.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via source-paper.pdf or text provided during the analyze content step.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not currently implement explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious directions embedded within the source PDF text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system access, shell command execution (via Python and Node scripts), and network operations via the Gemini API.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input text before it is interpolated into prompts for outline generation and image creation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 31, 2026, 08:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — paper-slide-deck