paper-slide-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate-slides.pyusessubprocess.check_callto automatically install thegoogle-genaipackage using the system's Python executable. This is used to ensure the environment is ready for image generation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves external dependencies at runtime. It uses
pipto download thegoogle-genaipackage from PyPI and employsnpxto run Node.js tools, which may download packages likepdfjs-dist,canvas, andpptxgenjsfrom the NPM registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime installation and execution of external packages from PyPI and NPM are present. However, the packages identified are well-known libraries from trusted sources (Google, PDF.js contributors, etc.) required for the skill's primary purpose of PDF processing and image generation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection risks (Category 8) as it ingests untrusted data from academic papers and user-provided content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
source-paper.pdfor text provided during the analyze content step. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently implement explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious directions embedded within the source PDF text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system access, shell command execution (via Python and Node scripts), and network operations via the Gemini API.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the input text before it is interpolated into prompts for outline generation and image creation.
Audit Metadata