research-lookup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied query text directly via command-line arguments or agent context and interpolates it into prompts sent to external LLMs.
- Ingestion points: User text is read via
sys.argv[1:]inlookup.pyandresearch_lookup.pyand passed into structural query objects. - Boundary markers: No strict boundary markers or delimiters are automatically added to separate user input from internal system instructions within the custom academic prompt format constructed inside
_format_academic_prompt. - Capability inventory: The ingested queries trigger outbound HTTP requests using
requests.posttohttps://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completionsor invoke theopenaiSDK to talk tohttps://api.parallel.ai. - Sanitization: Input text is converted to lowercase for simple keyword routing checks (
any(kw in query_lower for kw in self.ACADEMIC_KEYWORDS)), but there is no explicit sanitization to neutralize malicious embedded markdown or LLM instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation showcases how users can manually execute the python scripts using standard terminal command lines (
python scripts/research_lookup.py --model-info), which is standard utility orchestration rather than a vulnerability. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses Python
requestsand theopenaiclient to fetch analytical and academic text over the network from remote services (api.parallel.aiandopenrouter.ai), which represents normal vendor infrastructure connectivity.
Audit Metadata