zinc-database
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python integration examples in
SKILL.mdandreferences/api_reference.mdprovide templates that usesubprocess.runto executecurlcommands. These snippets construct URLs using f-strings with parameters likesmilesandzinc_idwithout implementing sanitization or proper URL encoding. This creates a surface for argument injection where a malicious chemical string containing shell metacharacters orcurlflags (e.g.,-o) could manipulate the command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted chemical identifiers which are then interpolated into tool calls.
- Ingestion points:
smiles,zinc_id, andcatitem_idparameters in functions located inSKILL.mdandreferences/api_reference.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided templates to prevent the agent from misinterpreting injected content.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network requests and shell execution via
subprocess.run(['curl', ...])across all integration scripts. - Sanitization: Input validation and escaping are absent in the primary code templates, although
urllib.parse.quote()is briefly mentioned in a troubleshooting section. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches chemical property data and 3D molecular structures from the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) official ZINC database domains (
cartblanche22.docking.org,files.docking.org).
Audit Metadata