davinci-resolve-video-edit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
vedit.pyscript executesffmpegandffprobeshell commands to perform audio extraction and media metadata probing. These calls use the recommended list-based argument format which helps mitigate command injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup documentation instructs the user to download approximately 7 GB of external resources, including Python libraries from the official PyTorch registry and a large-scale transcription model from Hugging Face. These sources are well-known and reputable.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes
listing.txt, which contains verbatim transcripts of user-provided video files. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions spoken in a video could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the editorial pass. - Ingestion points: Transcribed text from external media files is loaded into the agent's context from
listing.txtandsegments.json(created inscripts/vedit.py). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or safety warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions found within the transcribed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
ffmpeg) and perform DaVinci Resolve operations (via MCP tool calls). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the transcription output before it is read by the agent.
Audit Metadata