research-summarizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted source material (academic papers, web articles, PDFs) through its summarization and citation workflows. This creates a surface where an attacker-controlled document could contain hidden instructions attempting to influence the agent's summary or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Workflow steps in
SKILL.mdingest external text provided by the user for summarization, comparison, and citation extraction. - Boundary markers: The prompt instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when processing external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses Python scripts for formatting and extraction but does not have high-privilege capabilities such as network access or file-writing during runtime.
- Sanitization:
scripts/extract_citations.pyuses regular expressions to extract specific structured patterns (DOIs, URLs), which provides a baseline level of data filtering. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local Python scripts to perform citation extraction and template generation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains usage examples forpython3 scripts/extract_citations.pyandpython3 scripts/format_summary.py. Analysis of the source code for these scripts shows they use standard libraries for text processing and do not engage in dangerous shell or system operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external installation sources and a third-party registry for non-standard deployment.
- Evidence: Installation instructions in
SKILL.mdrefer togithub.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills.gitand theclawhubregistry. While these are vendor-owned resources corresponding to the author, they constitute external dependencies from sources outside the pre-approved trusted vendor list.
Audit Metadata