resume-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
exectool to perform initial setup by creating a local storage directory (mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/resume-builder). This is a legitimate functional requirement for storing user profiles and settings locally. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted job descriptions from users to perform features like resume tailoring and gap analysis.
- Ingestion points: Job description text pasted by the user into the chat for Features 6 and 18.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructional guardrails to prevent the AI from following commands potentially embedded within the job description text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
readandwritetools for the local storage directory, and a limitedexeccapability for directory management. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of text sanitization or filtering applied to the job descriptions before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata