resume-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the exec tool to perform initial setup by creating a local storage directory (mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/resume-builder). This is a legitimate functional requirement for storing user profiles and settings locally.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted job descriptions from users to perform features like resume tailoring and gap analysis.
  • Ingestion points: Job description text pasted by the user into the chat for Features 6 and 18.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructional guardrails to prevent the AI from following commands potentially embedded within the job description text.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to read and write tools for the local storage directory, and a limited exec capability for directory management.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of text sanitization or filtering applied to the job descriptions before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 09:46 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — resume-builder