customizing-statusline

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and code examples (in references/api.md and references/examples.md) encourage the generation of code that uses node:child_process.execFile to run shell commands such as git, gh, and osascript on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The migration guide in references/migration.md directs the agent to read sensitive shell configuration files, including ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, ~/.bash_profile, and ~/.profile, to extract user prompt settings. These files often contain sensitive information such as environment variables, API tokens, and aliases.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is the dynamic generation of executable TypeScript React (.tsx) mod files at ~/.letta/mods/statusline.tsx. This code is persisted to the filesystem and executed by the host application runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from existing mod files, user-provided shell scripts, and system configuration files.
  • Ingestion points: ~/.letta/mods/statusline.tsx, user-provided .sh scripts, and shell profile files (.bashrc, etc.) are read into the agent context.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of boundary markers or delimiters when ingesting this data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the user's home directory and execute shell commands via the generated mod code.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or validate the content extracted from these files before incorporating it into the generated statusline mod.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 27, 2026, 04:57 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — customizing-statusline