initializing-memory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill and its associated scripts access highly sensitive interaction history files located at
~/.claude/history.jsonland~/.codex/history.jsonl. These files contain the full record of user prompts and assistant responses, which may include credentials, private source code, and personal information. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell scripts (
detect-history.sh,list-sessions.sh,search-history.sh,view-session.sh) and command-line tools such asjq,git, andsplitto inspect, filter, and process local data. This includes parsing and displaying contents of session files to the agent context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill automates the extraction of "Hard Rules & Preferences" and "Project Context" from historical logs to be written into the agent's core
system/files. Since historical logs are untrusted and may contain malicious content from past sessions (e.g., instructions previously read from an attacker-controlled file), this workflow allows for the persistence of prompt injection attacks across the agent's identity and future sessions. - Ingestion points: Reads from global history files and project-specific session files in
~/.claude/and~/.codex/. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict boundary markers or sanitization requirements for content promoted to the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: Full filesystem write access to the memory directory, git operations, and subprocess execution via subagents.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement to sanitize or escape extracted content before interpolating it into core memory files.
Audit Metadata