cass
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a maintenance binary located at a hardcoded absolute path:
/Users/jean-patricksmith/.local/bin/cass-maintain. Hardcoding specific user home directories in a shared skill is a security risk and limits portability. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user to install a tool from a third-party Homebrew tap:
brew install dicklesworthstone/tap/cass. This source is not a verified or well-known organization, representing an unverifiable external dependency. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and displays session transcripts, which constitutes an ingestion of untrusted data into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points:
cass search,cass view, andtailcommands retrieve historical session data from files. - Boundary markers: There are no markers or instructions provided to the agent to treat the retrieved transcript content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute various CLI tools and scripts, creating a risk if a transcript contains malicious instructions that the agent might follow.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or filter the content of session logs before presenting them to the agent.
Audit Metadata