docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a C source code string (_SHIM_SOURCE) which it writes to disk, compiles at runtime usinggcc, and then injects into the process environment usingLD_PRELOAD. This is designed to shim AF_UNIX socket calls to support LibreOffice in sandboxed or restricted execution environments. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro and writes it to a temporary user profile (/tmp/libreoffice_docx_profile) to automate the acceptance of tracked changes in documents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
accept_changes.py,soffice.py,redlining.py) utilizesubprocess.runto execute external system commands includingsoffice(LibreOffice),gcc,git, andpdftoppm. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts untrusted
.docxand.dotxfiles as input (ingestion points inscripts/merge_runs.pyandscripts/office/validate.py). While the skill employs security best practices such as usingdefusedxmland explicitly instructing the agent to delete symlinks in unpacked directories, the complexity of the Office Open XML schema combined with high-privilege capabilities creates an attack surface for indirect injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to utilize external dependencies including thedocxnpm package and Python libraries likelxmlanddefusedxmlif not already present.
Audit Metadata