goal-exec
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a 'heartbeat' system and optional timers to manage 'long-horizon' goals. It instructs the agent to create or update automations on the host using idempotency keys derived from goal references, effectively maintaining execution capabilities across sessions through scheduled 'navigation wakes' (file: SKILL.md).
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a 'Goal Prompt' structure that ingests untrusted user requests for 'Outcome' and 'Plan' details and requires these to be passed verbatim to the
create_goaltool and the$coderexecution surface. - Ingestion points: User requests for goal setting and multi-session work (file: SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill uses structural headers (e.g., Outcome, Hard refs, Plan, Acceptance) but does not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious embedded content within the user-supplied fields.
- Capability inventory: Access to
$coderexecution tool,create_goaltool, and thelev execcommand (file: SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of user-provided content before interpolation into the verbatim goal prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to resolve execution flows dynamically as
lev://exec/<flow>and passes these identifiers to thelev execcommand for execution (file: SKILL.md). - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
references/long-running.mdfile references 'official OpenAI guidance' using non-standard domains (e.g.,learn.chatgpt.com,developers.openai.com) to ground its autonomous goal-management and persistence behaviors, which may mislead users or evaluators regarding the source of these practices.
Audit Metadata