agent-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and uploads Claude Code session history files from the local directory
~/.claude/projects/to the vendor's cloud service. This is the primary and documented purpose of the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes vendor-provided CLI commands, specifically
leverage whoamiandleverage sessions import, to facilitate identity checks and the transfer of session data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions suggest using
npxto install additional skills from the vendor's repository (leverage-computer/skills). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and processes Claude session history files (
.jsonl) which may contain untrusted content from previous LLM interactions. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are provided to the agent to mitigate potential injection risks embedded within the history data.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities to read local files and perform network uploads via the
leverageCLI. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the session history content is performed by the skill instructions, as the data is intended for direct import into another session.
Audit Metadata