ln-914-community-responder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches its own instructional components and templates from the author's repository (
github.com/levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills) using WebFetch if they are not present in the local environment. This is a documented mechanism for managing shared skill resources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI (
gh) and standard shell commands (grep,ls) to interact with the repository's metadata and search for technical answers within the codebase. These operations are within the stated scope of community engagement. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes untrusted user-generated content from GitHub issues and discussions. This risk is effectively mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop step where the user must explicitly approve any drafted response before it is published via the GitHub API.
- Ingestion points: GitHub Issue and Discussion bodies fetched via the GraphQL API in
SKILL.md(Phase 1). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompts to separate external content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Comment creation via
gh apiand codebase inspection viabashandgrepacrossSKILL.mdand referenced files. - Sanitization: All generated responses are subject to manual user approval (Phase 6) and a 'humanizer audit' (Phase 5) before deployment.
Audit Metadata