baoyu-danger-x-to-markdown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file
scripts/constants.tscontains a hardcoded bearer token (DEFAULT_BEARER_TOKEN) used for authenticating requests to the X API. Hardcoding authentication secrets is a poor security practice. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/cookies.tsuseschild_process.spawnto launch browser executables (Chrome, Edge, or Chromium) from a list of standard system paths or user-defined environment variables. This involves executing system binaries with arguments influenced by environment configurations. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) to extract sensitive authentication cookies (
auth_token,ct0,twid) from a browser session and writes them to a local JSON file (cookies.json) within the user's application data directory. Harvesting session tokens represents a high-impact data exposure capability. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from X (tweets and articles), which provides a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in the source content could potentially influence the behavior of an AI agent processing the resulting markdown.
- Ingestion points: Fetches tweet and article content from
x.comviascripts/graphql.tsandscripts/thread.ts. - Boundary markers: The generated markdown includes YAML frontmatter but lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the body content.
- Capability inventory: The skill scripts can perform file system operations (read/write), network requests, and execute system commands (browser spawning).
- Sanitization: Content is converted to markdown format but does not undergo security-specific filtering to neutralize potential natural language instructions.
Audit Metadata