baoyu-danger-x-to-markdown

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.30). In scripts/main.ts the CLI-provided X URL is parsed into a tweet/article ID and then the workflow calls fetchTweetThread/fetchXArticle (via scripts/graphql.ts) which fetches and parses outsider-authored tweet/article text from X (e.g., response.text() → JSON.parse → formatThreadTweetsMarkdown / formatArticleMarkdown), exposing the agent to free text at runtime.

HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

• Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned the repository for literal, high-entropy values that could grant access.
• The DEFAULT_BEARER_TOKEN in scripts/constants.ts is a long, random-looking Bearer token literal (not a placeholder). Bearer tokens are credentials that can be used to authenticate API requests, so this meets the "secret" definition and is flagged.
• Other values that look like IDs (FALLBACK_QUERY_ID, fallback query hashes, feature flags) are identifiers used for API queries, not credentials, so they are not flagged.
• Environment variable names (X_AUTH_TOKEN, X_CT0, X_BEARER_TOKEN, etc.) are referenced but no literal values provided — per rules these are ignored.