alera-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches issue details (title, body, labels) from GitHub, GitLab, and Azure DevOps via
alera workspace issue show(references/workspaces.md). It also reads incoming messages from other agents viaalera inbox wait(references/inbox.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including writing to terminals (
alera terminal write), installing skills (alera skill install), and managing SSH hosts. - Sanitization: No mention of sanitization or escaping of the ingested data is provided in the documentation.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
alera webhook addcommand (references/mcp.md) allows the runtime to send events, including inbox replies and agent states, to arbitrary external HTTPS URLs. This provides a direct mechanism for data exfiltration if an attacker can influence the configuration. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
alera automation createcommand (references/automations.md) supports scheduling persistent agent tasks using cron expressions. This allows for long-term execution of logic across sessions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
alera skill installcommand (SKILL.md) allows the installation of new skills into the runtime. This involves downloading and executing external logic, which is a form of remote code execution, although here it is used for platform extensibility. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
aleraCLI to perform system-level operations, such as managing Git worktrees, SSH targets, and local processes.
Audit Metadata