lintro-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
uvxto fetch and execute thelintropackage from an external registry during the review process. It also relies on external binaries likecursor-agentand theclaudeCLI. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands, including
git,grep,sed, anduvx, to manipulate configuration and run the review engine. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
git update-index --skip-worktreeon.lintro-config.yaml. This technique hides local modifications to the configuration file fromgit status, which can lead to configuration changes persisting without being visible to the user during normal repository inspection. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill uses
cursor-agent --trustto grant workspace trust non-interactively. This bypasses the manual security prompt designed to ensure users intentionally trust the code in the directory before allowing an AI agent to operate on it. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the contents of the current git branch and its diff against the base branch (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to isolate the git diff content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands, download and run remote packages, and interact with external AI model providers.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the branch diff content before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata