lintro-review

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses uvx to fetch and execute the lintro package from an external registry during the review process. It also relies on external binaries like cursor-agent and the claude CLI.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands, including git, grep, sed, and uvx, to manipulate configuration and run the review engine.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to use git update-index --skip-worktree on .lintro-config.yaml. This technique hides local modifications to the configuration file from git status, which can lead to configuration changes persisting without being visible to the user during normal repository inspection.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill uses cursor-agent --trust to grant workspace trust non-interactively. This bypasses the manual security prompt designed to ensure users intentionally trust the code in the directory before allowing an AI agent to operate on it.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads the contents of the current git branch and its diff against the base branch (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to isolate the git diff content from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands, download and run remote packages, and interact with external AI model providers.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the branch diff content before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 09:26 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lintro-review