content-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection in the
LLMAnalyzerclass withinscripts/llm_analyzer.py. - Ingestion points: Untrusted text is ingested through multiple methods such as
analyze_sentiment_llm,extract_topics_llm, andsummarize_text_llm, as well as from sample files likeexamples/sample_data/sample_reviews.csv. - Boundary markers: Absent. User-provided text is interpolated directly into prompts without using delimiters or boundary markers to isolate data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill configuration in
SKILL.mdallows the use of tools such asBash,Write, andEdit. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the input text before it is interpolated into LLM prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches necessary NLP data files from official sources.
- Evidence:
scripts/text_analyzer.pyandscripts/sentiment_analyzer.pyusenltk.download()to retrieve lexicons and tokenizers. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill communicates with external AI service providers.
- Evidence:
scripts/llm_analyzer.pyperforms network requests toapi.openai.comanddashscope.aliyuncs.comto perform text analysis. - Note: These communications are intended for the primary purpose of the skill and target well-known service providers.
Audit Metadata