sellersprite-rpa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
BrowserSkill (bsk)CLI tool viasubprocess.runto perform browser automation. Commands are constructed using list-based arguments, which prevents shell injection. Inputs are escaped usingjson.dumpsbefore being injected into the execution context. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/analyze.py, the skill usesimportlib.import_moduleto load specific reporting modules. This dynamic loading is secured by a hardcoded whitelist of allowed section names, preventing unauthorized module imports. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the
BrowserSkillproject on GitHub (github.com/Tencent/BrowserSkill). While this is a well-known source, the skill relies on the user to have the tool pre-installed rather than performing automatic downloads. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]:
scripts/bridge_browserskill.pycontains a hardcoded fallback path to an executable that includes a specific user profile name (C:\\Users\\49707\\...). This is a minor metadata leak regarding the author's development environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes data from external web sources.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested through browser-context
fetch()calls and DOM scraping withinscripts/core_api.pyandscripts/core_dom.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not implement explicit delimiters for the processed external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute the
bskCLI viasubprocess.runand write files to the local system usingwrite_csv. - Sanitization: The skill uses
json.loadsto handle API payloads and basic string cleaning for scraped text.
Audit Metadata