sellersprite-rpa

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the BrowserSkill (bsk) CLI tool via subprocess.run to perform browser automation. Commands are constructed using list-based arguments, which prevents shell injection. Inputs are escaped using json.dumps before being injected into the execution context.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In scripts/analyze.py, the skill uses importlib.import_module to load specific reporting modules. This dynamic loading is secured by a hardcoded whitelist of allowed section names, preventing unauthorized module imports.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the BrowserSkill project on GitHub (github.com/Tencent/BrowserSkill). While this is a well-known source, the skill relies on the user to have the tool pre-installed rather than performing automatic downloads.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: scripts/bridge_browserskill.py contains a hardcoded fallback path to an executable that includes a specific user profile name (C:\\Users\\49707\\...). This is a minor metadata leak regarding the author's development environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes data from external web sources.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested through browser-context fetch() calls and DOM scraping within scripts/core_api.py and scripts/core_dom.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not implement explicit delimiters for the processed external data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute the bsk CLI via subprocess.run and write files to the local system using write_csv.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses json.loads to handle API payloads and basic string cleaning for scraped text.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 09:49 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sellersprite-rpa