maestro-app
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to prefix a
bashcommand with environment variables derived from the$ARGUMENTSfield (e.g.,MAESTRO_IMPL_AGENTS="<list>"). Because the instructions do not require the agent to sanitize or escape shell metacharacters within this input, a user could provide input designed to break out of the string literal and execute arbitrary commands (e.g.,"; rm -rf /; #). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes multiple shell commands and Node.js scripts at runtime using both user-provided arguments and output from an external local application (
launch-ai-tools-manager-app.sh). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface where untrusted data from user input and external process output is used to perform sensitive file and execution operations.
- Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSvariable and the JSON payload returned from thelaunch-ai-tools-manager-app.shscript (stdout). - Boundary markers: None specified for the interpolation of
$ARGUMENTSor the processing of the form payload. - Capability inventory: File writing (
.claude/maestro.json), shell execution viabash(launcher and validation scripts), and Node.js script execution (maestro-render-orchestrator.cjs,maestro-apply-rules.js). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is defined for the untrusted inputs before they are used to build commands or write configuration files.
Audit Metadata