super-help
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes content from external documentation files without protective boundary instructions or sanitization.\n- Ingestion points: The
SKILL.mdfile instructs the agent to read documentation from paths outside the skill's directory using relative traversal (e.g.,${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../../../docs/plugins.md).\n- Boundary markers: Not present. There are no instructions to the agent to treat documentation content as data rather than instructions, or to ignore embedded prompts.\n- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the host agent's file system access; the package contains no executable scripts, binary files, or network-capable tools.\n- Sanitization: None. Content retrieved from documentation files is directly integrated into the agent's reasoning and synthesis process without filtering.
Audit Metadata