continuous-learning-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The background observer agent is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes session logs (
observations.jsonl) that may contain untrusted data from external tool outputs or attacker-influenced content. - Ingestion points: The
agents/observer-loop.shscript reads fromobservations.jsonl, which is populated with tool inputs and outputs by thehooks/observe.shhook. - Boundary markers: The prompt used to invoke the observer agent in
agents/observer-loop.shdoes not use strong isolation markers (such as XML tags or explicit "ignore instructions" delimiters) to separate its instructions from the ingested log data. - Capability inventory: The observer agent is invoked via the
claudeCLI with restricted permissions (--allowedTools "Read,Write"), preventing it from executing arbitrary shell commands or editing existing code, though it can create or update instinct files. - Sanitization: While the
hooks/observe.shscript performs regex-based scrubbing of common secret and credential patterns, it does not sanitize the logs for potentially malicious instructions intended for the observer agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for its core project detection and observation functionality.
- The
scripts/detect-project.shandhooks/observe.shscripts executegitandpython3to resolve project metadata and process JSON data safely. - The
scripts/instinct-cli.pytool usessubprocess.runto callgitfor repository root and remote URL detection, employing safe argument passing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/instinct-cli.pyCLI provides animportcommand that allows users to manually fetch instinct configurations from remote HTTP/HTTPS URLs using Python'surllib.requestmodule.
Audit Metadata