desktop-control
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains self-referential instructions that command the agent to avoid using file-reading tools like 'sed' or 'cat' on its own skill files and to override internal routing heuristics when specific user-input tags ($computer-use) are present.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Potential for Indirect Prompt Injection due to the ingestion of untrusted data from the browser DOM and desktop accessibility trees. Evidence chain:
- Ingestion points:
cli-jaw browser snapshotandget_app_state(app)read external UI text. - Boundary markers: Enforcement of a structured transcript format (
path=,action_class=). - Capability inventory: Full interactive control over the desktop via
click,drag,type_text, andset_valuetools. - Sanitization: No documentation of filtering or escaping for data ingested from the UI.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of the
cli-jawsuite and various 'Computer Use' tool calls to perform system-level automation tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata references the installation of the
cliclickutility via the Homebrew package manager as an optional fallback for pointer actions.
Audit Metadata