desktop-control

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains self-referential instructions that command the agent to avoid using file-reading tools like 'sed' or 'cat' on its own skill files and to override internal routing heuristics when specific user-input tags ($computer-use) are present.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Potential for Indirect Prompt Injection due to the ingestion of untrusted data from the browser DOM and desktop accessibility trees. Evidence chain:
  • Ingestion points: cli-jaw browser snapshot and get_app_state(app) read external UI text.
  • Boundary markers: Enforcement of a structured transcript format (path=, action_class=).
  • Capability inventory: Full interactive control over the desktop via click, drag, type_text, and set_value tools.
  • Sanitization: No documentation of filtering or escaping for data ingested from the UI.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of the cli-jaw suite and various 'Computer Use' tool calls to perform system-level automation tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata references the installation of the cliclick utility via the Homebrew package manager as an optional fallback for pointer actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 01:52 PM