skills/lidge-jun/cli-jaw-skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md suggest the installation of a forked version of the officecli tool from a personal GitHub repository (https://github.com/lidge-jun/OfficeCLI) via a shell script located in a global npm directory. While the skill appropriately requests user consent before installation, executing an external installation script to deploy a third-party fork represents a supply chain and code execution risk.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Utility scripts such as scripts/docx_cli.py and tests/generate_fixtures.py employ dynamic path computation to modify the Python module search path (sys.path). This behavior is used to load the ooxml_core package from environment-defined locations or the user's home directory, which could lead to arbitrary module loading if those paths are compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing external shell commands, specifically the officecli binary and soffice (LibreOffice). Furthermore, the test suite (scripts/run_tests.py) uses subprocess.run to execute internal scripts, representing a potential for misuse if arguments were to be influenced by untrusted data.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from external Word documents and provides functionality to chunk this text for the agent to read (scripts/docx_cli.py chunk). There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the extracted content. An attacker could craft a DOCX file containing hidden instructions that the agent might follow upon ingestion.
  • Ingestion points: Document text is read through officecli view and the chunking/searching subcommands in scripts/docx_cli.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; extracted content is presented to the agent without delimiters or safety warnings.
  • Capability inventory: Extensive file system modification and command execution capabilities across all skill scripts.
  • Sanitization: Although defusedxml is correctly used for secure XML parsing, the skill does not implement any sanitization or filtering of the natural language content extracted from the documents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 01:52 PM