goal
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to bypass user oversight and safety loops. In the 'Plan Goal Steer' section, it commands the agent to: 'Do NOT wait for user confirmation. Execute the full goal autonomously.' and 'Immediately refine the goal objective and enter PABCD orchestration.'
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill framework relies on the autonomous execution of shell commands (
cli-jaw orchestrate A/B/C/D) to transition through work phases without human-in-the-loop approval. The text explicitly states that goal mode 'supersedes PABCD phase gates for autonomous execution,' meaning no user wait occurs between planning and execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It is designed to ingest untrusted data from the codebase and then execute actions autonomously based on that data.
- Ingestion points: During the 'Context Scan' phase, the agent reads project documentation (README, CLAUDE.md), git history, and source code.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack any requirement for boundary markers or sanitization of ingested content before processing it for planning.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
cli-jaw), write to the filesystem (creating devlogs and artifacts), and perform git commits. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is interpolated into the autonomous planning and execution logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata