skills/lidge-jun/cli-jaw-skills/goal/Gen Agent Trust Hub

goal

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to bypass user oversight and safety loops. In the 'Plan Goal Steer' section, it commands the agent to: 'Do NOT wait for user confirmation. Execute the full goal autonomously.' and 'Immediately refine the goal objective and enter PABCD orchestration.'
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill framework relies on the autonomous execution of shell commands (cli-jaw orchestrate A/B/C/D) to transition through work phases without human-in-the-loop approval. The text explicitly states that goal mode 'supersedes PABCD phase gates for autonomous execution,' meaning no user wait occurs between planning and execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It is designed to ingest untrusted data from the codebase and then execute actions autonomously based on that data.
  • Ingestion points: During the 'Context Scan' phase, the agent reads project documentation (README, CLAUDE.md), git history, and source code.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack any requirement for boundary markers or sanitization of ingested content before processing it for planning.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (cli-jaw), write to the filesystem (creating devlogs and artifacts), and perform git commits.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is interpolated into the autonomous planning and execution logic.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 01:52 PM