gog
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata specifies the installation of a third-party command-line tool using Homebrew:
brew install steipete/tap/gogcli. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous instructions for executing shell commands to interact with Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Contacts, Sheets, and Docs using the
gogbinary. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its ability to ingest untrusted data and perform automated actions based on that data.
- Ingestion points: Gmail message content (
gog gmail search), Google Drive file contents (gog drive search), Google Sheets data (gog sheets get), and Google Docs text (gog docs cat). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not include delimiters or specific system-level warnings to the agent regarding the processing of untrusted content fetched from these services.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for high-impact actions including sending emails (
gog gmail send), replying to messages, creating or updating calendar events (gog calendar create), and modifying spreadsheet data (gog sheets update). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the ingested data is performed or instructed before the agent processes the content.
Audit Metadata