plankton-code-quality

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub account (alexfazio/plankton) to obtain its core logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill architecture relies on executing multiple shell scripts (multi_linter.sh, protect_linter_configs.sh, stop_config_guardian.sh) as part of tool hooks.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In Phase 3 ('Delegate + Verify'), the skill automatically spawns agent subprocesses to interpret violation data and perform code modifications. This creates a recursive loop where untrusted data (linter outputs or file content) can influence the instructions given to the subprocess agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions include system-level package installation via brew install jaq ruff uv and direct execution of uv sync --all-extras, which installs unversioned Python dependencies from the cloned repository.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The multi_linter.sh hook processes the content of any file edited by the main agent.
  • Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or warnings to the subprocess agent to ignore embedded instructions within the code it is tasked to 'fix'.
  • Capability inventory: The system has broad capabilities, including subprocess spawning, file-writing via formatters, and network access (implied by uv sync and potential model API calls for the 'fixer' agents).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or validation of the violation JSON before it is passed to the subprocess agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 01:52 PM