plankton-code-quality
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub account (
alexfazio/plankton) to obtain its core logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill architecture relies on executing multiple shell scripts (
multi_linter.sh,protect_linter_configs.sh,stop_config_guardian.sh) as part of tool hooks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In Phase 3 ('Delegate + Verify'), the skill automatically spawns agent subprocesses to interpret violation data and perform code modifications. This creates a recursive loop where untrusted data (linter outputs or file content) can influence the instructions given to the subprocess agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions include system-level package installation via
brew install jaq ruff uvand direct execution ofuv sync --all-extras, which installs unversioned Python dependencies from the cloned repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
multi_linter.shhook processes the content of any file edited by the main agent. - Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or warnings to the subprocess agent to ignore embedded instructions within the code it is tasked to 'fix'.
- Capability inventory: The system has broad capabilities, including subprocess spawning, file-writing via formatters, and network access (implied by
uv syncand potential model API calls for the 'fixer' agents). - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or validation of the violation JSON before it is passed to the subprocess agent.
Audit Metadata