linkedin-about-generator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources and uses it to drive agent behavior without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Reads .liftli/voice.md and ~/.liftli/voice.md for stories and proof; gathers 'raw material' from chat history and user resumes; calls a strategist_briefing tool and follows its instructions.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are present to ensure the agent ignores malicious commands that might be embedded in the resumes or voice files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read local files, call external tools, and present instructions for command execution.
  • Sanitization: There is no logic for validation or escaping of the ingested material before processing.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses content from the user's home directory path ~/.liftli/voice.md. Although this is a vendor-specific subfolder, accessing files within the home directory is a form of sensitive data exposure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to execute commands such as npx skills add liftli-ai/linkedin-agent-skills --skill linkedin-voice, claude mcp add ..., and claude mcp login liftli. These instructions facilitate the installation and execution of external software and configurations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 08:42 PM