linkedin-about-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources and uses it to drive agent behavior without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.liftli/voice.mdand~/.liftli/voice.mdfor stories and proof; gathers 'raw material' from chat history and user resumes; calls astrategist_briefingtool and follows its instructions. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are present to ensure the agent ignores malicious commands that might be embedded in the resumes or voice files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read local files, call external tools, and present instructions for command execution.
- Sanitization: There is no logic for validation or escaping of the ingested material before processing.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses content from the user's home directory path
~/.liftli/voice.md. Although this is a vendor-specific subfolder, accessing files within the home directory is a form of sensitive data exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to execute commands such as
npx skills add liftli-ai/linkedin-agent-skills --skill linkedin-voice,claude mcp add ..., andclaude mcp login liftli. These instructions facilitate the installation and execution of external software and configurations.
Audit Metadata