clarify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted user data (ideas, requirements, plans) to drive a Socratic clarification process. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the user's input could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: User input provided during the initial
$clarifyinvocation and subsequent conversational turns as described inSKILL.mdandWORKFLOW.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate presenting questions in a structured "round" format (e.g., Q1, Q2) and maintaining internal state via a
socraticengine, providing some structural delimiters between instruction and data. - Capability inventory: The skill can perform file writes to the
.scratch/directory and can route requests to other capabilities such aslight-research(network/read access) orlight-to-questionnaire. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions within the skill files for escaping or validating the content of user-provided messages before they are processed by the engine.
- [SAFE]: The skill implements several safety-oriented design patterns:
- Explicit Invocation: Requires a specific token (
$clarify) to start, preventing accidental activation by general user text. - Confirmation Gates: Explicitly requires user confirmation before completing a session or writing handoff files to the filesystem.
- Scoped File Access: Restricts file writing to a localized
.scratch/directory. - Least Privilege: Explicitly avoids automatic chaining of other user-invoked skills and requires separate authorization for fact-finding tasks involving external research.
Audit Metadata