light-typesetting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions explicitly recommend using the
-shell-escapeflag withlatexmkfor specific document features (e.g.,mintedfor code highlighting or TikZ externalization). This flag allows the LaTeX engine to execute arbitrary shell commands via the\write18primitive. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Enabling the
shell-escapecapability creates a vulnerability surface where a maliciously crafted LaTeX file could execute code on the host system during the compilation process. This risk is inherent to the primary function of advanced LaTeX typesetting but requires caution when processing external or unverified content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of dependencies from various standard sources. It uses
npmto install thedocxlibrary,pipformarkitdown(sourced from Microsoft's GitHub), andtlmgrfor LaTeX packages from TeX Live repositories. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data (LaTeX source, bibliographies, and document content) through a multi-step compilation and conversion pipeline. It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization to prevent indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in the document content could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during subsequent processing steps.
- Ingestion points: Document content from
m07/m08, reference data fromm10, and figure metadata fromm11are interpolated into LaTeX and Word templates. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation logic.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of
latexmk,tectonic,node, andpython(viaprecheck_log.py). - Sanitization: No content escaping or validation logic is present before document generation.
Audit Metadata