claude-code-dispatch

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the bash tool to invoke the Claude Code CLI tool (claude).
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to use the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag. This flag is designed to suppress all interactive confirmation prompts within the Claude Code environment. By using this flag, the agent bypasses the standard human-in-the-loop security controls, allowing the sub-agent to autonomously modify the local filesystem and execute terminal commands without oversight.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface by delegating complex tasks to a sub-agent using arbitrary prompt strings (-p). If these strings incorporate untrusted data from the project or external sources, they could influence the sub-agent to perform unauthorized actions. The risk is elevated because the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag removes the user's ability to review and block those actions.
  • Ingestion points: The prompt argument (-p) for the claude command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide instructions to wrap the sub-task prompt in delimiters or warn the sub-agent about potentially malicious embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The sub-agent (Claude Code) has broad capabilities including file system read/write and arbitrary shell command execution.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation or escaping for the instructions passed to the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 05:58 PM