inno-experiment-dev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources into agent prompts without robust boundary markers or sanitization. * Ingestion points: Data enters the context via variables such as
survey_res(user ideas),references(external papers),code_survey_res(survey notes), andjudge_res(feedback loop) as seen inSKILL.mdand the templates in theprompts/directory. * Boundary markers: The prompt templates use simple text labels but lack strong delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. * Capability inventory: TheML Agent(documented inreferences/ml_agent_instructions.md) has access to tools includingexecute_command(shell access),run_python,write_file, and package managers (pip,conda). * Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the interpolated variables. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
Machine Learning Agentis explicitly instructed to install missing dependencies usingpip installorconda installduring the implementation phase, which involves downloading unverified third-party packages. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves the execution of shell commands and Python scripts that are dynamically generated or modified by the agent itself.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to write project structures and then execute the resulting code. In the submission phase, the agent is instructed to dynamically modify existing scripts to adjust parameters and add checkpoint-saving logic before execution.
Audit Metadata