skills/lijigang/ljg-skills/ljg-blind/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ljg-blind

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests historical AI conversation logs from $HOME/.codex/sessions/ to identify cognitive blind spots. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in previous conversations could influence the agent's current analysis.
  • Ingestion points: JSONL session files containing previous user and assistant messages.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore previous instructions" markers are used when interpolating log data into the prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the ~/Context/ directory and perform network requests via curl.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses jq to filter out some system-level tags (e.g., <environment_context>) but does not sanitize the user-provided text content for instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands (find, jq, curl, date) to locate session files, extract message content, and interact with the WeRead API.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Makes network requests to i.weread.qq.com (WeRead) to search for books and retrieve chapter information. This is a well-known service and the operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Executes a local TypeScript tool (Tools/WeReadWebUrl.ts) via the bun runtime. This script performs algorithmic encoding of IDs to generate web links and does not perform additional network or file operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 02:34 AM