ljg-blind
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests historical AI conversation logs from
$HOME/.codex/sessions/to identify cognitive blind spots. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in previous conversations could influence the agent's current analysis. - Ingestion points: JSONL session files containing previous user and assistant messages.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore previous instructions" markers are used when interpolating log data into the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the
~/Context/directory and perform network requests viacurl. - Sanitization: The skill uses
jqto filter out some system-level tags (e.g.,<environment_context>) but does not sanitize the user-provided text content for instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands (
find,jq,curl,date) to locate session files, extract message content, and interact with the WeRead API. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Makes network requests to
i.weread.qq.com(WeRead) to search for books and retrieve chapter information. This is a well-known service and the operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Executes a local TypeScript tool (
Tools/WeReadWebUrl.ts) via thebunruntime. This script performs algorithmic encoding of IDs to generate web links and does not perform additional network or file operations.
Audit Metadata