ljg-paper-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to bypass a specific platform execution model (the seven-step Algorithm workflow) in favor of a 'NATIVE' mode. While this overrides standard operating procedures, it is done to streamline the specific multi-tool pipeline rather than to bypass safety or ethical guidelines.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources, including ArXiv URLs, paper PDFs, and web links.
- Ingestion points: User-provided paper links and file paths are extracted and passed to subsequent tools.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the content of the processed papers.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute the
ljg-paperandljg-cardtools (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the text extracted from the external papers before it is processed by the subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates the execution of two vendor-prefixed tools,
ljg-paperandljg-card. This usage is consistent with the author's identity ('lijigang') and represents the core intended functionality of a workflow aggregator.
Audit Metadata