introduce
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the exclamation-backtick syntax (
!ACTIVE=$(cat personas/_active.md 2>/dev/null || echo "default"); ...) to execute shell commands at load time. It reads thepersonas/_active.mdfile and uses its content to dynamically construct file paths for subsequentcatcommands without validation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The files
personas/$ACTIVE/persona.mdandpersonas/$ACTIVE/nuance.mdare read and injected into the prompt. - Boundary markers: Absent. The content of these files is directly appended to the agent's context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities through dynamic context injection and filesystem read access.
- Sanitization: None observed. Content from external files is loaded raw into the session.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions command the agent to "Adopt this persona's voice, tone, and decision-making style for the rest of the session", which serves as a persistent override of the agent's baseline identity and safety constraints.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple
catcommands to read filesystem data during the initialization phase via the dynamic context feature.
Audit Metadata